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Abstract: The Elephant Marsh, a wetland in Southern Malawi, is important for small-scale 
fisheries. It is managed by local institutions, which are not formally linked to any state 
institutions. This paper uses qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to examine factors for 
sustainability at 24 fishing villages around the wetland using a hypothesis that “If strong 
local institutions (with or without government support) exist in an environment where 
resource users take collective action, and there is no or minimal conflictive interference, 
small-scale fisheries become sustainable”. It was revealed that the sustainability of small-scale 
fisheries management at Elephant Marsh relies heavily on the strength of local fisheries’ 
committees. Future interventions on fisheries management at the resource should, 
therefore, pay particular attention to protecting and (re)building collective social capital, 
especially in the leadership of fisheries committees. 
Keywords: small-scale fisheries; wetland; sustainability; local institutions; Elephant Marsh; 
conditions; governance; Malawi 
 
1. Introduction 
Small-scale fisheries (SSF) support the livelihood of over 180 million people in developing 
countries [1]. Despite their relative importance, studies on the management constituency of SSF in 
developing countries are limited. Most of the well-known studies have been done in developed 
countries where SSF are scarce [2,3]. The deficiency in downscaled studies has led most decision 
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makers in developing countries to manage SSF using more generalized blueprint panaceas generated in 
developed countries. 
Due to background developments, such as population growth, rural poverty, climate change, and 
market forces, the exploitation pressure on SSF is likely to increase. In such scenarios, Hardin [4] 
would propose that some regulatory authority (likely a central government mechanism) should come in 
to regulate the resource before the commons are overexploited. Indeed, in the early 1990s central states 
had put themselves at the center of managing common pool resources (CPR) [5] resulting in conflicts 
rather than sustainability [6]. One reason for the failure has been that centralized bureaucracies are 
often unable to respond to rapid social-ecological change [7]. As a result of the general failure of 
central governments to manage common pool resources, there has been a shift towards more 
participatory, joint management arrangements [8,9]. 
Joint management arrangements were engineered quite early in SSF [10] but have gained wide 
application in forest management [11]. The design of successful management arrangements in SSF is 
not simple and depends on the locally-based institutional “bricolage” that focuses on the necessary 
points of engagement between resource users and regulatory authorities, such as the central  
states [12,13]. 
For developing countries, the institutional design dilemma is compounded by the stratification of 
the social, economic, political and biodiversity landscapes. Several scholars [14–17] have questioned 
the rationale behind the adoption and implementation of “imported” institutions in systems that have 
been poorly understood. Nevertheless, most efforts in small-scale fisheries management in developing 
countries have put a lot of emphasis on setting up co-management arrangements. The approach in 
Africa, for example, has been a hasty, ceremonial, top-down devolution of some aspects of management 
from central states (which are usually weak) to local communities resulting in an imbalance of power 
and interests. 
From the critical perspective of Ward and Weeks [18] and Carswell [19], it may be noted that the 
co-management discourse still justifies “raison d’être” of state regulators. Thus, the critical 
perspective leads to a research platform that can reveal instances where purely community-based 
fisheries management can be conceptualized along with the other management types. Hints that such 
research might be fertile are given, for instance, by Hara and Nielsen [14], who point out that  
co-management in Africa appears to be more of an illusion than an empowerment of local fishing 
communities and there is need to find some bold answers to its ability in achieving the objectives of all 
players. Even years after Ostrom’s work [10], Jentoft et al. [16] also found it difficult to conceptualize 
the necessity of the state in the management of fisheries by mentioning that “an alternative agent like 
the state is not always needed and community level civil institutions play a greater role in fisheries 
management if they are allowed and equipped to do so”. In some cases, however, informal institutional 
building can get support from centralized formal law like in the V-notch lobster program as reported 
by Acheson [20]. The good news though is that small-scale systems such as SSF are easier to drive to 
success than large-scale entities because of the reduced number of competing interests and minimal 
layers of organization [21]. 
The Elephant Marsh, a wetland in southern Malawi, is important for SSF and the management 
arrangements are quite informal. The wetland is managed by local institutions, which are not formally 
linked to any strong state institutions. Malawi also lacks a management framework strong enough to 
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enforce a balanced and sustainable wetland development under rising pressures, such as 
overexploitation and agricultural conversion, which are mainly driven by population growth, rural 
poverty, climate change and market growth. In the Elephant Marsh, additional drivers include 
fluctuation in water levels caused mainly by hydroelectric power generation at Kapichira Dam and the 
abstraction of water for irrigation by Illovo sugar estate; both located upstream. Moreover, the 
coordination of the roles of the various stakeholders in wetland management at Elephant Marsh is not 
very clear or stable [22]. It is therefore important to determine factors of success for these  
locally-based management arrangements in order to achieve long-term sustainability of the fishery at 
Elephant Marsh and reflect upon optimal roles of the state. 
Case studies from which lessons on SSF in developing countries can be drawn and applied to the 
Elephant Marsh Fishery are found, for example, in Chile, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi, India, 
Laos, Mexico, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Senegal, and Nigeria [23–34]. While some are 
success stories, others are not. Experiences from Kafue Flats Floodplain Fishery in Zambia for 
instance, reveal that although central states promise many theoretical benefits when devising 
management arrangements, there is usually limited involvement and cost-benefit analysis of local 
group interests resulting in social resentment and consequent counter productivity [6,31]. However, it 
is interesting to note that in Malawi, for example, the formation of functional local institutions, which 
get support from the central state usually starts with a strong collective social capital. Although the 
Malawi government has taken a supportive role at lakes Chiuta, Malombe, and Chilwa, the fishery at 
Lake Chiuta is the only one that is striving due to the good social structures at local scale [26].  
This is consistent with findings by Gutiérrez et al. [35] where fisheries management was not successful 
in communities with low social capital (probably due to internal stratification and hierarchies),  
even when there was continued government effort. Some cases, such as Lake Chilika in India [27], 
reveal an interesting scenario. While the state is not supportive and there are no co-management 
arrangements, the fishery is still a success because of a strong collective social capital. It is therefore 
logical to suggest that conditions of success for each fishery are unique and can only be established if 
the system in question has been thoroughly studied. This paper uses qualitative comparative analysis 
(QCA) to examine factors of success at 24 fishing villages around the wetland using a hypothesis that 
“If strong local institutions (with or without government support) exist in an environment where 
resource users take collective action, and there is no or minimal conflictive interference, small-scale 
fisheries become sustainable”. 
The next section reviews literature on small-scale fisheries management in developing countries and 
provides a basis for the variables used in the analysis. The third section provides the methods used and 
how the scores for each variable were generated. The fourth section gives results and discussion.  
The paper ends with some implications for future policy direction and small-scale fisheries 
management practice in developing countries. 
2. Small-Scale Fisheries Management in Developing Countries 
Being a form of resource extraction, capture fisheries usually do not continuously require high 
inputs after making the initial investment in the acquisition of the extraction equipment. Informally 
put, once you have the boat and fishing gear, you tend to go on fishing. Thus, the economics of 
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extraction easily lead to over-exploitation of the resource. Moreover, capture fisheries usually start out 
as an open access situation and even if access is closed to only a restricted group, full privatization is 
usually impossible and the fisheries remain a common pool resource, hence, subject to the risk of 
Hardin’s [4] “tragedy of the commons” that leads to resource exhaustion. Hardin [4] concluded that 
communal natural resources can only be sustained if a coercive central authority organizes the 
exploitation. Béné et al. [36] observed that “over-exploitation of a resource which is owned by many 
and not effectively managed by anyone, leads to reduction in catch and eventual poverty of users and 
others who would otherwise benefit from the harvests”. 
Capture fisheries are sometimes protected against over-exploitation by natural circumstances such 
as sheer size, inaccessibility or cold, as shown for instance in Brox [37] and Planque et al. [38].  
In most cases however, small-scale capture fisheries, consisting for instance of inland water or tropical 
seas are seldom protected by natural means, thereby requiring strong institutions that can regulate 
extraction by humans and achieve sustainability of the resource. Such regulatory institutions can be 
locally based, state controlled or a crossbreed of the two in what is widely known as co-management. 
In her book, “Understanding Institutional Diversity”, Ostrom [39] defines institutions as rules, 
norms and shared strategies that mediate human behavior. From this perspective, it clear that the 
sustainability of SSF depends on a continuum of attributes that positively shape human actions towards 
a negotiated consensus on powers and responsibilities in relation to the fisheries resource at either 
supra-local level (e.g., existence of guiding legislation and policies from central government) or local 
level (e.g., leadership, power relations, benefit sharing). Several scholars [17,40–42] have decried the 
lack of recognition and involvement of small-scale local fishers in fisheries management, especially in 
developing countries. To achieve a balanced representation in decision-making, there is more shift to 
arrangements in which local communities and governments share responsibilities over a resource. 
Although the basic idea of such arrangements is to achieve equal power sharing (strong government 
versus strong communities), the application of the notion has varied widely especially in small-scale 
fisheries management where the socio-ecological context is quite complex and diverse [41,42]. 
Whatever the case, these partnerships require high levels of compliance from local communities and 
significant support, information sharing, consultation, advice and cooperation from government [43] in 
order to sustainably manage common pool resources. Ostrom [10] identified eight conditions for the 
success of managing common pool resources. The conditions are: (i) clearly defined boundaries 
around the resource; (ii) congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions; 
(iii) collective-choice arrangements; (iv) monitoring; (v) graduated sanctions; (vi) conflict resolution 
mechanisms; (vii) minimal recognition of rights to organize; and (viii) nested enterprises. Based on 
earlier studies [22], the fishery at Elephant Marsh in Malawi can ably achieve the first two principles 
mainly due to a good collective social capital at resource level. Collective social capital, in this respect, 
is defined as the social capacity of groups, in terms of trust and institutions, to take collective action [13]. 
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Table 1. Choice of the conditions of interest at the Elephant Marsh Fishery. 
Ostrom’s 
Condition/Attribute [10] 
Definition of the  
Condition/Attribute 
Variables that Define the Attribute/Condition  
at the Elephant Marsh Fishery 
Current Status of the 
Condition/Attribute at Elephant 
Marsh/Justification for Inclusion  
in the Study 
Clearly defined boundaries 
at the resource 
Individuals or households who have rights to 
withdraw resource units from the CPR must 
be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of 
the CPR itself 
Each fishing village has a defined boundary agreed upon 
by fishers and their leadership, legitimate users (non-
outsiders) are known, and the external boundaries of the 
wetland are clear. 
Condition met [22] 
Congruence between 
appropriation and 
provision rules and  
local conditions 
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, 
technology, and/or quantity of resource units 
(in this case fish) are related to local 
conditions and to provision rules requiring 
labor, material, and/or money 
Fishers pay small amounts of money to obtain a fishing 
license, get labor, purchase acceptable fishing gear, have 
restricted periods of entry into the resource.  
Condition met [22] 
Collective choice 
arrangements 
Most individuals affected by the operational 
rules can participate in modifying the 
operational rules 
Existence of local democracy, ability to influence or 
change operational rules, Influence of the chief on choice 
of fisheries committee leadership? Are women included in 
the fisheries committee leadership? Boat theft or absence 
of theft? Do community members trust each other? Are 
fishers migrating to other fishing villages? For the local 
situation at the Elephant Marsh, this is attainable if 
collective social capital at village level is good. 
Not clear before this study 
Monitoring 
Monitors who actively audit CPR conditions 
and appropriator behavior are accountable to 
the appropriators or are the appropriators 
Are the fisheries assistants from government/government 
officers present? What is the impact of the presence of the 
government officers? Does their presence have any impact 
on the communities that use the CPR? Do the officers just 
come to “police” or they inform and teach fishers other 
things on fisheries management? 
Not clear before this study 
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Table 1. Cont. 
Ostrom’s 
Condition/Attribute [10] 
Definition of the  
Condition/Attribute 
Variables That Define the Attribute/Condition  
at the Elephant Marsh Fishery 
Current Status of the 
Condition/Attribute at 
Elephant Marsh/Justification 
for Inclusion in the Study 
Graduated sanctions 
Appropriators who violate operational 
rules are likely to be assessed graduated 
sanctions (depending on seriousness and 
context of the offense) by other 
appropriators, by officials accountable to 
these appropriators or by both 
What the status of the local leadership in form of fisheries 
committee chairman? Actual implementation of the rules by the 
committee chair? Reputation of the committee chair (Knowledge 
and ability to act), Presence of own office space for the 
committee, are by-laws there for implementation, Does the 
implementation depend on extent/level of offence? Is this really 
done/ are the by-laws really implemented? 
Not clear before this study 
Conflict resolution 
mechanism 
Appropriators and their officials have rapid 
low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts 
among appropriators or between 
appropriators and officials. 
Chiefs, fisheries committee leadership, government officials? 
The hierarchy of conflict resolution (Chiefs, fisheries committee 
leadership, government officials). Does the chief uphold the roles 
of the fisheries committee in conflict resolution? 
Not clear before this study 
Minimal recognition of 
rights to organize 
The rights of the appropriators to devise 
their own institutions are not challenged by 
external government authorities 
Interference from state? Does the state challenge the right of 
users to create their own local institution? What roles do the 
government officers have? What is the optimal role of the 
state/government agents? 
Not clear before this study 
Nested enterprises 
Appropriation, provision, monitoring, 
enforcement, conflict resolution and 
governance activities are organized in 
multiple layers of nested enterprises 
National guiding principles/ government officials? What is their  
level of support in policy direction and information sharing? Is 
the fishery operating according to national guidelines? Is there 
cross-scale cooperation? 
Not clear before this study 
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Using evidence from several authors [44–46] and as highlighted by Ostrom’s [10] list in Table 1, 
the sustainability of SSF at Elephant Marsh may also depend on several other factors  in addition to a 
good collective social capital at resource level. For example the presence (or absence) of government 
officers and the leadership of local chiefs in conflict resolution mechanisms can either be positive if 
they uphold the roles of local fisheries management committees or negative if they calculatedly take a 
more “power defending” position (conflictive interference) [35,47]. Conflictive interference may 
consequently bring administrative difficulties and social divisions at resource level [6,17,46]. 
It is therefore not surprising that most of the conditions on Ostrom’s [10] list, especially the last six, 
are seldom attained in developing countries like Malawi. For instance, “Minimal recognition of rights 
to organize” necessitates legitimacy and strong recognition by central states of the locally constructed 
institutions while “nested enterprises’’ underscores the fact that central states are important for support 
(policy direction, information sharing) so that issues of cross scale cooperation can best be addressed. 
Wilson et al. [41] observe that local SSF management cannot be effective if it is not considered 
legitimate by stakeholders especially when central states are too weak to enforce formal rules for 
controlling activities of intruders and safeguarding supra-local values such as biodiversity and external 
ecosystem services. The overall result is usually voluntary compliance, which eventually 
disadvantages locals and erodes local institutions [6,40]. On the other hand, if central states fail to 
devolve power to local communities in joint management arrangements and consistently take a 
position of commanding, imposing and enforcing alien rules and regulations, the negotiated fulcrum is 
lost, sporadic illegal activities may emerge and the management system is likely to fail [17,48–52]. 
From the literature reviewed, it seems the management constituency of the Elephant Marsh fishery 
is built around collective social capital (which may depend on the leadership of the local fisheries 
committee or village chief), and the presence of a central state, which might be supportive 
(recognizing, helping, educating, informing, power sharing) or conflictive (imposing alien regulations). 
This paper seeks to provide some preliminary contribution to the importance of four factors namely: 
collective social capital at village level (CSC_V), collective social capital at local fisheries committee 
level (CSC_C), presence and influence of government agents (GOV), and the role of chiefs (CHF) in 
the success of local SSF management at Elephant Marsh in Malawi. 
3. Study Area 
Elephant Marsh is located on the East African Rift Valley floor in the southern part of Malawi 
(14°25′–17°50′S and 35°15′–35°15′E), see Figure 1. It covers an average area of about 600 km2, 
although actual size varies from about 2700 km2 in the wet season to 500 km2 in the dry season.  
The variation creates season-oriented pressure on the ecosystem goods and services that communities 
can draw from the wetland. The Elephant Marsh straddles the administrative districts of Chikhwawa 
and Nsanje, which fortunately follow similar institutional arrangements and therefore no major  
trans-district problems arise. The region has an average altitude of 500 m above sea level and an 
annual precipitation range of 560 to 960 mm. The mean annual precipitation in Malawi is 1180 mm 
and the altitude ranges from 50 to 3000 m asl. The marsh is fed by the Shire River, the only outlet  
of Lake Malawi, which flows through it in a southerly direction before joining the Zambezi River  
in Mozambique. 
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Figure 1. Map of the Elephant Marsh showing the location of the fishing villages. 
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The marsh has relatively grassy margins but the bulk of its surface is formed by a mosaic of rooted 
swamp vegetation (sudd), floating vegetation and open water. In the southern part, this pattern is 
interspersed with islands with saline soils and palm trees. The Elephant Marsh is also home to several 
species of fish, out of which Clarias gariepinus (locally known as mlamba), Oreochromis 
mossambicus (chambo), Oreochromis placidus (makumba), and Barbus ssp. (matemba) comprise over 
90% of the commercial catch [22]. 
The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list identifies Rynchops flavirostris 
(African skimmer) and Oreochromis mossambicus (chambo) as species under threat in its natural  
range while the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) list includes 
Crocodylus niloticus (Nile crocodile) and Hippopotamus amphibius (hippopotamus). The Elephant 
Marsh is therefore a very important habitat for these species. 
The annual fish production from around the Elephant Marsh has been estimated at an average of 
8500 tons [22]. This figure possibly includes the lower sections of the Shire River downstream from 
Elephant Marsh but generally indicates an annual production of 141.7 kg/ha. There are no recent data 
on the trends of fisheries exploitation at the Elephant Marsh partly due to lack national interest in 
carrying out research on common pool resources such as the Elephant Marsh. Unfortunately, such data 
is very important for future impact assessment studies. 
Management arrangements at Elephant Marsh are guided by customary law. At village level and 
under guidance of a traditional chief, each development sector is represented in the form of an 
executive committee that is responsible for coordination of specific activities. In the fisheries sector, 
the village level committee is called a Beach Village Committee (BVC), which also controls access to 
the Elephant Marsh through Beach Chairs. Some twenty-four fisheries committees are found around 
Elephant Marsh. Based on our field visits in 2013, the arrangement appears to be working well based 
on community membership of the wetland users. Immigrants are restricted from access to the wetland 
but are allowed, for example, as fish traders and processors. In most cases, they are easily identified 
and referred to as “Angoni” meaning “outsider” (although Angoni is a name of an ethnic group). 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Research Variables 
The present study focuses on analysis of success and failure factors for sustainable SSF in at the 
Elephant Marsh Fishery using crisp set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA). Data were collected 
between April and November, 2013. The preceding literature review (Section 2) has indicated that 
these success and failure factors should at minimum include: (i) the collective social capital of the 
fisheries committee; (ii) the collective social capital of the fishing village; (iii) the presence of 
government agents and their influence; (iv) how the chief of the village is involved in fisheries 
management (conflictive or supportive role); and (v) the overall status of the fishery (outcome) in 
terms of sustainability. Sustainability in this respect is looked at with the assumption that it is not 
attributable to variations related to climate, river discharge, or decline from original to sustainable 
yield levels. Data for all the five variables were collected through focus group discussions, interviews, 
and observations. Triangulation was attained by using emic (insiders’ view) and etic (researchers’ 
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impression) approaches. The following is a summary of the main attributes that were looked at to come 
up with a score of either (0) for failure or (1) for success. The general guideline was to have a strict 
cut-off between 0 and 1 s. 
i. Collective social capital for committee: The actions of the fisheries committee are motivated by 
several factors including reputation of the leader and communal value attached to fish.  
This variable was quantified using five attributes: (i) the etic (researchers’ impression) of the 
quality of the fisheries committee chairperson (knowledge and ability to act); (ii) presence of 
own fund at fisheries committee level; (iii) availability of a committee-owned structure 
(building for meetings/office); (iv) presence of written by-laws; and (v) the actual 
implementation of graduated sanctions to offenders by fisheries committee. Each attribute had a 
score of 1 resulting in an overall additive maximum of 5 points. As an input variable for data 
analysis the 5 points were assessed as a score of (1) while anything lower was assessed as (0). 
ii. Collective social capital for the village: When community cohesion is strong, achievement of a 
common purpose is easier than in an environment of conflict. The score for this attribute was 
based on (i) collective community effort to keep the sanitary conditions of the beach clean and 
the existence of local democracy; (ii) boat safety/absence of theft; (iii) inclusiveness of females 
at the beach (e.g., as fish processors and traders); (iv) willingness to explore trust-based 
investment (e.g., fishers to give their catch of the day to a trader for sale at a market and only 
get proceeds after the trader has sold the fish); and (v) migration of fishers to other villages for 
fishing reasons, (indicator of a “bad beach”). Each attribute had a score of 1 resulting in an 
overall additive maximum of 5 points. As an input variable for data analysis the 5 points were 
assessed as a score of (1) while anything lower was assessed as (0). 
iii. Government visits and impact: The score for this attribute was based on the frequency of 
official visits by government agents and the impact of what they do during the visits. According 
to Malawi’s Department of Fisheries, government agents are supposed to visit a beach at least 
twice a month for extension activities. This essentially translates to a minimum of 24 possible 
visits in a year. The impact of the visits was measured at three levels: (i) “come and look” gave 
an impact factor of 1; (ii) “come, look and police” gave an impact factor of 2; while (iii) “come, 
look, teach/inform and police” gave an impact factor of 3. A final score was generated by 
multiplying the number of visits in a year by the impact factor to give a minimum positive 
impact score of 72 points (i.e., 24 × 3). As an input variable for data analysis 72 points or more 
(if there was a higher frequency of visits) were assessed as a score of (1) while anything lower 
was assessed as (0). 
iv. Chief’s support: Due to the customary arrangement, the chief is important in upholding the roles 
of the fisheries committee. The score for this attribute was based on whether the chief is 
supportive or in conflict with the affairs of the fishing site, especially the fisheries committee 
using three indicators (i) etic impression (e.g., from stories of conflict or other negative 
allusions); (ii) opinion of fishers, traders and fish processors and (iii) opinion of government 
officials. Each indicator had a score of 1 resulting in an overall additive maximum of 3 points. 
As an input variable for data analysis the 3 points were assessed as a score of (1) while anything 
lower was assessed as (0). 
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v. Sustainability: The score for this attributes is based on the researchers’ objective assessment [53] 
and insiders’ view (emic) of four indicators (i) stability of catch (abundance overfishing);  
(ii) quality of catch (non-juveniles for the late maturing Oreochromis and Tilapia species);  
(iii) trends in the catch per unit effort (CPUE); and (iv) the ability to keep non-community 
members (immigrants) out of the resource. Each attribute had a score of 1 resulting in an overall 
additive maximum of 4 points. As an input variable for data analysis the 4 points were assessed 
as a score of (1) while anything lower was assessed as (0). 
4.2. Qualitative Comparative Analysis and the Defining Variables 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) focuses on linking an outcome to casual configurations, 
which are considered as explanatory conditions. There are three QCA techniques (based on set theory 
and Boolean algebra) namely: Multivariate QCA, crisp set QCA, and fuzzy set QCA. As indicated 
earlier, this paper uses crisp set QCA because of its ability to portray multiple causal combinations 
including minority effects. A crisp set is a condition in which a case may be interpreted, based only on 
two possible outcomes (0 or 1) expressed as either in or out; true or false; yes or no. For example, a 
specific fishery might be successful (1) or not (0) if there is a conflictive village chief. The limitation 
with csQCA is that the method does not allow for intermediate scenarios because it is case-based. 
Table 1 specifies the definition of each of the variables in formal terms. 
4.3. Crisp Set QCA and an Overview of the Case Studies 
Crisp set QCA is done in six steps [54–56] using TOSMANA (Tool for Small-N Analysis) version 
1.3.2.0 [57]. It allows a direct conversion of hypotheses into variables (Table 2), which are relevant for 
all the cases, followed by building of a raw dataset for the cases (Table 3) and construction of a truth 
table. The third step involves resolving contradictory configurations (outcomes that lead to 0 for some 
observed cases and 1 for other cases) before performing Boolean minimization (Step 4), which helps to 
clarify and simplify complex expressions of causal configurations. Step 5 identifies the logical 
remainders (combinations that are possible but have not been observed among the cases). The truth 
table and overall result of the analysis (Box 1) are automatically generated by TOSMANA (Step 6). 
The fishing villages are presented based on their location (East or West) on the banks of the marsh. 
Table 2. The variables. 
Variable Abbreviation Definition Score 
Collective social capital_ committee CSC_C 
Strong collective social capital at 
local fisheries committee level 
0 or 1 
Collective social capital_ village CSC_V 
strong collective social capital at 
village level 
0 or 1 
Government Agents GOV 
Presence and influence of 
government agents 
0 or 1 
Village chief CHF Chief is in conflict the community 0 or 1 
Outcome OTM Fishery is sustainable 0 or 1 
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Table 3. The dataset for the 24 fishing villages. 
Case ID Name of Beach Location CSC_C CSC_V GOV CHF OTM 
I Nkolimbo East Bank 0 0 1 0 0 
II Mwala East Bank 1 0 0 1 1 
III Chigwamafumu East Bank 1 1 0 1 1 
IV Njale East Bank 1 1 1 1 1 
V Namanthongo East Bank 0 1 0 1 0 
VI Mpandeni East Bank 0 0 1 0 0 
VII Twaya East Bank 0 1 0 1 0 
VIII Mchachajemusi East Bank 1 1 1 1 1 
IX Bwemba East Bank 0 0 1 0 0 
X Chuluchamkango East Bank 1 0 1 0 1 
XI Nsambokulira East Bank 1 1 0 1 1 
XII Nyangu East Bank 0 1 1 0 0 
XIII Nthenda East Bank 0 0 1 0 0 
XIV Mitawi East Bank 1 0 1 1 1 
XV Thedzi East Bank 1 1 1 1 1 
XVI Nyalugwe East Bank 0 0 0 1 0 
XVII Nyaulombo East Bank 1 1 1 1 1 
XVIII Mchesi West Bank 0 0 0 1 0 
XIX Alumenda West Bank 1 1 0 1 1 
XX Pindani West Bank 1 1 1 0 1 
XXI Bulawayo West Bank 0 0 1 0 0 
XXII Chisamba West Bank 1 1 1 1 1 
XXIII Ntchenyela West Bank 0 0 1 1 0 
XXIV Chambalo West Bank 0 1 1 1 0 
5. Results and Discussion 
From Table 3, one can easily deduce that that the dataset is simple enough to manually analyze the 
trends without the use of csQCA. For example, in all cases where CSC_C = 0, there is no sustainability 
irrespective of a positive score for a good collective social capital of the village, presence and 
influence of government agents or a conflictive chief but when CSC_C = 1, there is always 
sustainability. The csQCA is still used however to have more formal certainties. 
Using csQCA, the truth table of the 24 cases generated in the TOSMANA Analytical Report  
(Box 1) shows that different configurations (sustainability and non-sustainability) could be found 
among the empirical cases. 
The output is read as: sustainable small-scale fisheries management at Elephant Marsh is observed 
in fishing villages (II, III, XI, XIX, IV, VIII, XV, XVII, XXII, X, XIV, XX) that have a strong 
collective social capital at fisheries committee level (COLLECTIVE SOCIAL CAPITAL_ 
COMMITTEE {1}). 
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Box 1. The overall output of the analytical process. 
 
The overall result from this study has revealed that a good collective social capital at the fisheries 
committee level is the key factor in determining sustainability of locally-based wetland fisheries 
management at the Elephant Marsh. In most cases, weak economies like Malawi have very low 
financial capacity to support fisheries management activities at community level. The lack of material 
and financial resources forces the agents to be simultaneously present or absent [6], thereby creating 
shortfalls in the effectiveness of management programs. This study has underscored that the presence 
of government agents in itself does not contribute much to fisheries sustainability. Policy  
makers should therefore shift their effort towards establishment and strengthening of capable local 
leadership, which can spearhead community interests and ensure the sustainability of a resource. As 
most scholars [11,17,46] have observed, one of the major challenges in establishing efficient local 
management structures in Malawi is the question of power sharing between village heads and fisheries 
committee leadership. At Lake Chilwa Fishery in Malawi, for example, there are 43 fishing 
committees and access is controlled through issuing of licenses from the Department of Fisheries 
(DoF) and the enforcement of local rules is done by the committees. However, there are reported 
power struggles between the local chiefs and the fisheries committee leadership resulting in weak 
social relations that jeopardize the sustainability of the fishery [26]. Nielsen et al. [58] also pointed out 
that the involvement of chiefs in SSF can be a delicate matter because local chiefs do not always 
operate in ways that fit well with transparency and participatory decision-making arrangements. In all 
Sustainability 2014, 6 4023 
 
 
but two (Chuluchamkango and Pindani) fishing villages at Elephant Marsh, the inability of the village 
chiefs to devolve some of their power to local fisheries committee leadership resulted in failure of a 
fishery. It is not surprising therefore to note that collective social capital at village level was 
disintegrated at almost all sites where the chief was conflictive. Similar observations have been made 
at Kafue Flats Fishery in Zambia [31]. At the same time it is interesting to note that good collective 
social capital at village level did not automatically translate into good leadership at the fisheries 
committee level. Many scholars have warned against the tendency of assuming group homogeneity in 
community structures that exhibit good collective social capital [41,42,44]. While it is difficult at this 
moment to rule out the influence of government agents in the management of SSF at Elephant Marsh, 
it is clear that future efforts in making the Elephant Marsh fishery a success seem to dwell more on 
identifying good local leaders, grooming them to build or strengthen the existing collective social 
capital, and encouraging cross-scale interactions amongst all fishing villages around the wetland so 
that sustainability of the common resource can safeguarded. It should also be realized that building 
such well-organized social systems for SSF management takes time [21]. There is, therefore, need to 
develop novel approaches, which can accommodate popular communal transformation of resource users 
under the guidance of a motivated and trusted local leader. Culturally, Malawians are reluctant to 
individually challenge decisions made through community consensus [1] and that makes it easier for a 
group to “silently” stand against unpopular, unilateral decisions, which a village chief can make [26,51]. 
It is therefore not strange that in some cases successful local committees were found in villages where 
the chiefs are conflictive. These findings reinforce the notion by Basurto [29] that when there is good 
local leadership at resource scale, local communities are able to organize themselves and develop 
efficient local management systems that can avoid the overexploitation of SSF even when support 
from central states is limited. One point to consider though is that in most parts of the world, even in 
countries with the highest literacy levels, fishers tend to attain lower levels of education [26], hence, 
most central states are reluctant to give them power and accept that they have the ability to organize 
themselves and sustainably manage a resource. 
6. Conclusions 
The sustainability of small-scale fisheries management at Elephant Marsh in Malawi depends on 
building strong local institutions with motivated leadership that can safeguard the interests of resource 
users. Future practice and policy directions on fisheries management at Elephant Marsh should 
understand the relevance of concrete local community trust, networks, norms plus values and strive to 
streamline them in decision making and policy formulation. The government of Malawi should begin 
to take a more participatory position in designing locally crafted working institutions for the 
sustainability of common pool resources, such as small-scale fisheries at Elephant Marsh. In villages 
where fisheries fail due to weak local institutions or conflictive chiefs, the imposition of fishing rules is 
futile. Feasible government reaction seems to lie in (re)building collective social capital, especially the 
leadership of a fisheries committees and formally linking the established local institutions to the 
central government structure. 
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